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The evaluation of ecosystems and biodiversity has become an important field of inquiry for 
economists.  Although  this  development  has  been  largely  motivated  by  the  search  for 
arguments  in  favour  of  more  ambitious  conservation  policies,  both  the  methods  and  the 
meaning of the results continue to be controversial. This article aims to clarify the interests 
and  limitations  of  this  works,  by  revisiting  a  number  of  issues,  such  as  the  economic 
qualification of the services that human societies take from nature, the specificities of their 
contribution to human well-being, or the consequences of a valuation of biodiversity based 
on  ecosystem  services.  We  conclude  with  a  discussion  of  the  purposes  of  evaluations: 
improving public policies or creating new markets? 
 
Résumé  
L’￩valuation  des  ￩cosyst￨mes  et  de  la  biodiversit￩  est  devenue  un  domaine  de 
questionnement à part entière pour les économistes. Bien que ce développement ait été 
largement motiv￩ par la recherche d’arguments en faveur de politiques de conservation plus 
ambitieuses, les m￩thodes mises en œuvre et les r￩sultats obtenus continuent à faire l’objet 
de controverses. Cet article vise à pr￩ciser l’int￩r￪t et les limites de ces travaux, en revisitant 
un certain nombre de questions, telles que la qualification économique des services que les 
sociétés humaines se procurent auprès de la Nature, les spécificités de leur contribution au 
bien-￪tre humain, les cons￩quences d’une ￩valuation de la biodiversit￩ à partir des services 
écosystémiques.  On  conclut  par  une  discussion  des  finalités  de  ces  évaluations : 
amélioration des politiques publiques ou création de nouveaux marchés ?  
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1  Introduction  
 “To say that we should not do valuation of ecosystems is to simply deny the reality that we 
already do, always have and cannot avoid doing so in the future”. (Costanza et al., 1998).  
“The  world's  ecosystems  are  capital  assets.  If  properly  managed,  they  yield  a  flow  of  vital 
services, including the production of goods (such as seafood and timber), life support processes 
(such  as  pollination  and  water  purification),  and  life-fulfilling  conditions  (such  as  beauty  and 
serenity).  Moreover, ecosystems have value in terms of the conservation of options (such as 
genetic diversity for future use) (1). Unfortunately, relative to other forms of capital, ecosystems 
are poorly understood, scarcely monitored, and (in many cases) undergoing rapid degradation 
and depletion. Often the importance of ecosystem services is widely appreciated only upon their 
loss”. (Daily et al. 2000)  
Earth  ecosystems  provide  valuable  services  supporting  human  life.  Since  before  the 
development of agriculture, thousands of years ago, they have been modified and managed 
to  satisfy  human’s  needs  and  desires.  It  does  not  imply  that  they  can  or  have  to  be 
economically valued, and the quantification and economic valuation of economic services 
remain  controversial  (Sagoff,  2011).  Nevertheless,  the  exploitation  of  natural  systems, 
including efforts to modify and manage them, implies to confront the tradeoffs between real 
and potential services, and effects upon their resiliency. More generally, innumerable choices 
made every day by billions of people impact ecosystems and many will result in biodiversity 
losses and to various extend of social costs.  
The  concepts  and  methods  to  value  ecosystems  and  biodiversity  have  progressively 
emerged and their roots can be found in the core of economic theory of value (Daily et al., 
2000; Gomez-Baggethum et al., 2010). The recent enthusiasm for these analyses appears to 
have been mostly initiated by the needs of conservationists that were looking for stronger 
reasons  for  more  ambitious  policies  aiming  at  protecting  the  nature  and  biodiversity 
(Balmford et al., 2002). The current situation can then be characterized by a worrying gap 
between the perceived importance of improving our understanding of the dependence of 
ours economies and societies upon the maintenance of well functioning ecosystems (Daily, 
1997; Costanza et al., 1997; Balmford et al., 2002; Braat and Ten brink, 2008; Reid et al., 
2005, Sukhdev, 2008; TEEB, 2009) and the theoretical and practical unresolved difficulties to 
build consistent and reliable analysis of this dependency.  
This  paper  proposes  a  rather  general  overview  of  the  potential  and  difficulties  of  the 
economic approach of the valuation of ecosystems and biodiversity, and suggests a more 
personal view on a few issues. Section 2 clarifies some conceptual issues raised by these 
studies. Section 3 discusses technical aspects related to methods and objects through which 
the existing studies try to approximate the value of biodiversity and nature's services. Section 
4 comes back to the significance of the results obtained by a few large-scale studies. The 
article concludes with a discussion of the purpose of these evaluations, mobilized both to 
inform public policies and to discuss the introduction of market mechanisms.  
2  Practical and conceptual issues  
Most economists involved in the biodiversity valuation debate entered this area, sometimes 
reluctantly, after they have been invited to do so by conservationists who hoped to find in 
economic analysis strong advocacy to stop biodiversity losses. And many economists were 
very cautious entering this debate since they knew how poorly equipped they were to build 
convincing  and  reliable  arguments  (Hanley  et  al,  1995;  Nunes  et  van  der  Bergh,  2001; 
Hanley et Shogren, 2002…).    3 
2.1   Why is biodiversity so important to human societies?  
The biodiversity concern has become so widely pervasive in our societies that addressing 
the  question  of  the  importance  of  biodiversity  appears  somewhat  outmoded.  It  may 
nevertheless remain useful to insist upon the diversity of reasons that can advocate for more 
ambitious conservation policies.  
2.1.1  Evidence  
Several of these reasons are easy to understand since biodiversity or, more precisely the 
ecosystems that express the diversity of life, offers a large variety of goods and services that 
support human life: provision of food; fuel and construction materials; purification of air and 
water; stabilization and moderation of global climate; moderation of floods, droughts, extreme 
temperatures and wind forces; generation and renewal of soil fertility; maintenance of genetic 
resources that contribute to the variety of crops and animal breeding, medicine and other 
products ; recreational, aesthetic and cultural benefits (MA, 2005).  
Apart from these actual benefits, biodiversity plays a significant role as an insurance or a 
safety  net  in  our  changing  world,  especially  for  the  most  vulnerable  human  populations 
whose  well-being  depend  often  more  directly  upon  productive  ecosystems  (Quaas  et 
Baumgärtner, 2008). On a global scale, biodiversity must be considered in connection with 
major issues as for example poverty reduction (Dasgupta et Mäler, 1993), food security and 
fresh water availability, economic growth, conflicts over the use and ownership of resources 
(Baland et François, 2005), human, animal and plant health, energy and climate change
1.  
There are two massive evidences upon which most analysts strongly agree. Two centuries 
after  the  so -called  industrial  revolution  and  despite  major  changes  in  agriculture, 
manufacturing,  mining,  transportation,  and  technology,  our  societies  remain  strongly 
dependent on well functioning ecosystem for life support, production inputs or amenities 
(Daily, 1997; Diaz et al, 2006). On the other hand, the re is strong evidence that human 
activities threaten ecosystems and biodiversity (MA, 2005; GBO -3, 2010). Biodiversity thus 
appears both as the source of goods and services whose degradation threatens human well-
being, and something at stake in many human and social choices.  
2.1.2  Freedom of choice  
The  Millennium  Assessment  synthesis  report  (MA,  2005)  highlighted  the  links  between 
ecosystem services and the elements that contribute to human well-being in a now widely 
published and used general scheme. This scheme identifies four categories of constituents 
of well-being (security, basic material of good life, health, and good social relations) and what 
appears  as  a  background  category:  the  freedom  of  choice  and  action,  defined  as  the 
“opportunity to be able to achieve what an individual values doing and being”.  
The  suggested  symmetry  between  the  supporting  functions,  which  make  possible  the 
ecosystem services to human societies, and the freedom of choice that render human being 
able  to  draw  benefits  from  this  services  is  the  clearest  lesson  from  this  graphic.  It 
emphasizes the statement that, without the possibility of choosing their action, the question 
of the value of ecosystem services has no meaning. The question of the economic value can 
only be addressed when there is a choice, and we will see that the nature of economic value 
implies, at least implicitly, the existence of alternative option of choice.  
                                                 
1 There is in fact an economic controversy on a possible ambiguous role played by the dependance of the poor 
populations upon forest and other common property natural resource, between safety net and poverty trap (see 
Delacote, 2009), but the insurance mechanism provided by well functionning ecosystems is widely regognized.    4 
2.2  The value of nature and the nature of economic value  
Values  are  norms  that  allow  judging,  individually  or  collectively,  if  something  is  good, 
beautiful,  true,  useful,  moral,  etc.  Value  analysis  can  be  addressed  in  many  conceptual 
frameworks  that  can  be  structured  by  opposing  the  objectivist  approaches  that  tend  to 
establish the basis of a universal hierarchy among things, and the subjectivist ones that 
relate the value of the thing on their relative desirability. The economic conception of value is 
often  summarized  in  the  idea  that  economics  values  things  according  to  their  utility  and 
scarcity.  Without  restating  what  Daily  et  al.  (2000)  already  clarified,  several  points  have 
nevertheless to be made explicit here.  
2.2.1  The nature of economic values  
The economic perspective is anthropocentric; only the point of view of human beings can be 
taken into account. This statement does not mean that only human direct interests can be 
considered  by  economic  analysis.  It  means  that  only  the  effects  that  affect  human 
psychology and can impact human well-being will be part of economic analysis.  
Economic values are consequentialist. The judgment on the economic value of choices and 
actions  is  not  related  to  their  concordance  to  deontological  principles,  but  only  to  their 
consequences on human well-being. Intrinsic values have no economic meaning and the 
things get economic value according to their contribution to human well being; this is why 
economic valuation is said instrumental and in most cases utilitarist. Once again, it does not 
mean that more sophisticated reason to conserve nature cannot be considered, but these 
consideration are apprehended through the filter of human preferences.  
Despite recurrent attempts to establish the foundations of an objective approach of value, 
subjective approaches are now widely prevalent, which is obviously problematic for things for 
which agents do not have a clear awareness of the benefits they receive.  Since human 
beings,  especially  in  developed  economies,  are  used  to  consider  that  the  production 
processes, which supply most part of their consumption, are no longer dependants upon well 
functioning ecosystem, it cannot be expected that they spontaneously value biodiversity very 
high.  
Finally, the standard approach of value is marginalist. Valuation does not aim at absolute 
measures, but relies on marginal rates of substitution in order to determine how much of an 
increase in B can compensate the utility loss due to the reduction of one unit of good A. 
Since most economic analysis relies on ordinal instead of cardinal approaches of utility, the 
meaning of valuation is less to measure than to compare. This statement puts the emphasis 
on the fact that economic valuation refers explicitly to individuals’ preferences.  
A value approach based on comparisons raises the question of its universality: Is everything 
comparable? Economically, comparing the contribution of things to social well-being means 
that,  at  some  level;  one  thing  can  substitute  another.  The  idea  that  everything  can  be 
substituted  is  certainly  not  spontaneously  accepted.  This  intuition  must  be  discussed 
because the concept of substitution refers to different levels of analysis: replacing the object, 
substituting the service, maintaining the well-being. The difficulty to replace technically some 
assets does not necessarily mean that the benefits society derives from its use or existence 
cannot be compensated in terms of well-being by some other elements.  
2.2.2  Biodiversity as a commodity? 
From the perspective of an economist, biodiversity is of interest for two reasons. On the one 
hand, biodiversity is valuable to society: the greater the biodiversity, the better off we are, 
and if we lose some biodiversity, we judge ourselves to be worse off (Diaz et al., 2006). On 
the other hand, choices made by society have had and are continuing to have impacts on 
biodiversity: some of these choices, including without having had the intention or even the 
awareness,  have  adversely  impacted  biodiversity.  Clearing  land  or  draining  wetlands  for   5 
agriculture or development, harvesting timber from primary forests, overfishing, for example, 
have  caused  biodiversity  losses.  These  statements  led  the  economist  to  consider  that 
biodiversity  is  a  scarce  and  valuable  resource,  and  thus  to  some  extend  regarded  as  a 
commodity. G. Heal (2000) lists several reasons for this perspective: biodiversity provides or 
enhances  ecosystem  productivity,  insurance,  knowledge,  and  ecosystem  services.  Can 
biodiversity, however, be regarded as an economic good?  
Biological diversity is a characteristic of sets or systems, such as populations, ecosystems or 
landscapes, which themselves only imperfectly satisfy the properties of rivalry and exclusion 
that describe the standard economic goods. The benefits that an agent receives as a result 
of the beauty of a landscape or the existence of a gene for the synthesis of a molecule of 
pharmacological interest are not reduced by the fact that another agent receives benefit from 
the same asset. And it would be difficult to deny access to a service such as the regulation of 
some pollution or local climate that certain ecosystems produce and of which humans beings 
benefit even when they don’t have any direct  interaction with them.  Biodiversity  appears 
therefore as having some properties of a public good. But most uses, whether they involve 
taking or are related to aesthetic and scenery, can suffer of congestion or excessive demand 
can create rivalry. The most appropriated economic qualification thus appears to be that of 
common  property  resources,  which  generally  are  not  efficiently  produced  or  maintained 
solely through the market mechanisms.  
As a characteristic of ecosystems enhancing their social value, biodiversity appears both as 
a local and a global common. Perrings and Gadgil (2003) showed that, since biodiversity 
conservation provides benefits at different organisation levels, a well-designed management 
framework should integrate the importance of articulating local and global public benefits. 
But,  more  generally,  E.  Ostrom  (1998)  argued  in  favour  of  a  polycentric  governance  of 
biodiversity based on the “law of requisite variety”, which states that any regulative system 
needs as much variety in the actions that it exists in the system to be regulated. She agues 
that complex resource systems and biodiversity can successfully be maintained by complex, 
polycentric, multi-layered governance systems through a variety of mechanisms. A central 
issue  is  here  that  at  each  level,  there  must  exist  a  sufficient  congruence  between  the 
effective management rights and the awareness of the social values at stake.  
2.3  Biodiversity, values, and public policies 
2.3.1  Is Nature substitutable? 
Since ecosystems and biodiversity appears as valuable resource, economist have developed 
a conceptual framework, which aims at measuring the Total Economic Value (TEV) of these 
assets. Since the seminal paper of Krutila (1967) and the large debate that was raised by its 
first implementations in the 1980’s, this concept has been widely discussed and used. The 
TEV is typically defined as the integration of direct and indirect use values, option values and 
non-use values in a common framework or, in a simpler contrasting presentation, as the sum 
of use and non-use values.  
The various use values, albeit they can sometimes be difficult to identify in real situation or to 
measure  practically,  don’t  really  raise  conceptual  issues  today.  Social  debate  may, 
nevertheless occur when it comes to the social distribution of these values (Opschoor, 1998). 
Thought it can be of a real importance for decision-making, this issue is in no way specific of 
the biodiversity field, since it is a general critic of utilitarism that only refers to the sum of the 
interests at stake, and not to their distribution.  
The case of non-use values is quite different. The controversies that emerged with their 
introduction in the economic analysis are not totally clarified. There are still interrogations on 
their economic meaning, or even on their economic nature. Among the economists who have 
discussed the utilitarian basis of economic analysis A. Sen proposed a dualist view of the 
individual, both a consumer who seeks to satisfy his preferences and a citizen who makes   6 
judgements  on  objectives  that  may  exceed  his  own  interests. Within  these  interests  "for 
others",  Sen  distinguishes  "sympathy"  which  is  reflected  by  the  existence  of  altruistic 
arguments in the utility function, and "commitment" expressing ethical principles which may 
make the individual approve changes that reduce his utility.  
The relation to nature is particular since it appears impossible to avoid it: human beings are 
the product of their co-evolution with other living beings, irrespectively to the progress of 
human autonomy, human life and survival remain dependent on ecosystems functioning. 
Some works (Turner, 1993; Ekins et al, 2003; Neumayer, 2010 among many others) have 
explored  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  critical  level  below  which  a  decrease  of  "natural 
capital"  could  be  replaced  by  additional  of  manufactured  capital  or  human,  but  instead 
resulted in a decrease in their effectiveness. If such a threshold exists, then, as suggested by 
D. Pearce (2007), the economic analysis of biodiversity is relevant only insofar as this limit is 
not crossed. When an option of the choice may lead to cross it, the question of substituting 
Nature  or  even  nature’s  services  becomes  too  difficult  to  handle  and,  beyond  non-use 
values,  confront  the  limits  of  our  scientific  understanding  of  our  biophysical  dependence 
(Daily et al, 2009), and possibly fundamental ethical issues (Maris, 2010).  
2.3.2  Biodiversity as a merit good?  
This kind of distinction can relate to the opposition between instrumental, including non-use 
values and intrinsic values. Turner et al. (2003) provided a framework on the foundation of 
the  value  of  Nature  that  goes  far  beyond  the  usual  economic  categories  and  the  sole 
interests  of  human  beings.  They  especially  distinguish  anthropocentric  values  and  non-
anthropocentric values, related to the interests that biological diversity  presents for  other 
species and the ecosystems themselves. Is the utility for human beings the only or even the 
main reason for conserving nature? Answering this question would go far beyond the scope 
of this paper. Many authors have contributed to this debate, and economics is certainly not 
the best conceptual framework to explore all its dimensions.  
A possible road to introduce the issue is to oppose the case when human point of view 
remains of interest and those when it is not acceptable to rely on human judgement. In the 
first  case,  the  point  is  to  define  deontological  principles  that  will  possibly  allow  to  make 
practical choices and avoid too many decisions to become tragic or “awkward choices” (see 
Hanley and Shogren, 2002; or in a different perspective Sagoff, 2004; 2008). In other cases it 
seems necessary to consider more general ethical frameworks that go beyond human sole 
interests, such as the moral right to existence of any life form (for a recent synthesis see 
Maris, 2010).  
Economic analysis is not comfortable with the case when the preferences of individuals are 
not  a  usable  base  for  decision  making,  which  refers  to  what  economists  qualify  as 
“paternalism”.  There  are  strong  arguments  that,  when  it  comes  to  choices  involving 
biodiversity,  individuals’  preferences  are  not  adequate  for  efficient  decision-making.  The 
understanding of the complex biophysical relations and regulation that drives biodiversity is 
clearly not appropriately rendered in the preferences of economic agents or political citizens. 
This  inaccuracy,  which  should  diminish  as  people  becomes  increasingly  aware  of  these 
questions, leads us to pay special attention to the notion of "merit goods" (Musgrave, 1987) 
for which an evaluation resulting from the agents' preferences cannot be used directly to 
justify collective choices. The merit goods dimension of biodiversity can be explained by the 
agents' lack of familiarity with the "goods" and by the difficulty of explaining the ways in which 
they  are  "useful"  to  them.  Therefore,  the  appropriate  level  of  protection  or  conservation 
implies the intervention of an authority, not only due to the public good characteristics of 
several elements that contribute to the value of biodiversity and the ecosystem services, but   7 
also due to an incomplete or biased perception of that value, related to the indirect and 
incomplete perception of the services provided
2.  
Confronted with this difficulty, the idea of constructing a measurement of the goods to be 
produced or preserved and to choose it commensurate with the other economic goods could 
however form a useful step towards taking these goods into account in decision making and 
a  practical  means   of  socially  managing  their  production.  This  statement  addresses 
nevertheless a challenge both to economic valuation methods that remain largely dependant 
upon observable costs or behaviours, and to the choice of the objects that will materialize the 
concept of biological diversity for the purpose of evaluation. 
3  Material and methods  
Although facing severe conceptual issue, the valuation of biodiversity has become a widely 
developed area of research, and we have to come back to the methods and techniques that 
economists have build in attempts to circumvent these obstacles.  
3.1  On the valuation techniques  
During  the  last  decades,  a  large  scientific  and  administrative  literature  has  repeatedly 
reviewed  the  available  methods  that  enable  to  produce  practical  measurements  of 
ecosystem services values and it must be questioned if there is still anything new to be said 
on valuation methods. The first point is to restate that, despite its misleading name, the so-
called total economic value does not pretend at estimating an absolute value of ecosystems, 
but its purpose is to allow the addition of the multiple economic reasons (Balmford et al., 
2002) that underlie the social values of ecosystem services or threatened ecosystems. The 
valuation consists of comparing different situations and provides a measurement of changes 
in human well-being between these situations. For this purpose, evaluation must be built 
from observations, which raises the question of what is observable. Ultimately, these are the 
individuals’  preferences  that  must  be  made  observable,  which  may  involve  helping 
individuals to build them.  
3.1.1  What is observable?  
Aside from the recurrent debate on the conceptual and methodological issues raised by the 
economic valuation of non-market goods, valuations methods have to deal with empirical 
data. Following textbooks, these techniques can be introduced according to the nature of the 
data used: effective technical costs, observable behaviours and choices, statements when 
confronted to questionnaires. These data have then to be treated in order to obtain price-
equivalent,  under  the  assumption  that  individuals'  preferences,  which  are  admittedly  the 
foundation of economic value, are adequately summarized in willingness to pay or to accept 
compensations.  
Table 1 gives a conventional presentation of valuation techniques that opposes vertically 
methods based on observations directly related to natural assets and methods which use 
observations on goods or activities, which are associated as complementary to the natural 
assets  (like  travel  costs  to  scenery  viewing).  Horizontally,  it  contrasts  methods  in  which 
preferences are revealed through choices and behaviours, and methods in which individuals 
                                                 
2 Merit goods, for which agents are not able to express reasoned preferences, are sometimes related 
to public goods, for which the problem is not that preferences are biased but that there is no incentive 
to translate preferences into behaviour ("free riding" issue). The two categories often overlap (Fiorito 
and Kollintzas, 2004) and this is the case for biodiversity. The agents' relationship with the public 
authority can therefore be considered to be a delegation of choice. Concrete public decisions often 
rely on expert knowledge, and in the best case on the benevolence of the policy-makers. As a matter 
of fact, the expertise process related to biodiversity is mostly managed through specialised NGO.    8 
are invited to state their preferences in the frame of ad hoc questionnaire that lead them to 
express directly willingness-to-pay or indirectly choices between alternatives whose cost is 
one of the arguments.  
Table 1. A diversity of valuation methods for non-market goods and services  
 
  Revealed preferences  Stated preferences 
Direct methods   Monetary valuation at market prices  
Avoided costs, productivity effects  
Costs of restoration, replacement  
Contingent valuations  
 
 
Indirect methods   Prevention or protection 
expenditures  
Travel costs  
Hedonistic prices  
Contingent ranking  
Comparison by pairs  
Joint analysis: choice experiment, 
choice modelling  
Source: adapted from Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009.  
The valuation of the benefits of biodiversity conservation raises two main problems. The first 
one has already been addressed when we proposed to consider biodiversity as a merit good. 
Many people are poorly informed about the meaning and issues related to biodiversity. Their 
preferences do not constitute a satisfactory basis for evaluating biodiversity, complicating the 
use  of  stated  preferences  techniques,  because  information  must  be  given  to  the 
respondents,  while  avoiding  to directly influencing their preferences.  Hanley et  al. (1995) 
found that willingness to pay for biodiversity protection increases with the level of information 
provided. The second point is often described by the fact that individuals’ preferences for 
biodiversity protection may be lexicographic
3 rather than utilitarist. If this were true for many 
individual,  the  cost -benefit  analysis  would  become  invalidat ed  as  a  guide  for  decision 
making.  Despite  evidence  that  below  a certain limit  (unfortunately  difficult  to  determine
4) 
Nature’s  services  become  less  substitutable,  multiple  observations  have  shown  that 
individuals have the ability to make trade-offs between biodiversity and other assets when 
faced with situations of choice.  
3.1.2  Stated preferences: helping individuals to build their preferences  
When  individuals  are  faced  with  choices  involving  numerous  variables,  the  standard 
assumption of pre-existing and stable preferences for all possible situations may be totally 
unrealistic. The constructed preference hypothesis suggests that preferences do not exist 
prior to choice situation but rather are created at the moment of choice (Slovic, 1995). This 
theory predicts that preferences will be malleable to the choice environment, such as framing 
or anchoring effects. On the other hand, the discovered preference hypothesis (Plott 1996) 
considers  that  preferences  exist  but  that  they  need  to  be  uncovered  through  a  process 
involving practice, repetition and experience. This process will result in stable preferences 
that are consistent with economists’ standard beliefs. It is more and more considered that 
market behaviour does not reveal underlying true preferences but rather context-dependent 
preferences.  The  growing  evidence  of  a  design  effect  in  stated  preference  methods  is 
consistent with this theoretical framework.  
Regarding stated preference methods there is indeed a long lasting debate on the design-
dependence of the results. Since these techniques are not based on observable facts, many 
questions arise, many of them are related to the so-called bias affecting contingent valuation 
                                                 
3 Preferences are said “lexicographic” when individuals do not consider the possibility of compensating 
the  loss of biodiversity through an  increase in the availability  of another good or service. As  in  a 
dictionnary, the value of the first item is what it is, and can not be changed by varying the following.  
4 The existence and practical identification of this limit has led to a considerable debate on the notion 
of “critical natural capital” which is at the core of the opposition between strong and weak conceptions 
of sustainability (Ekins et al., 2003; Neumayer, 2010).    9 
(CV) method, namely the question of embeddedness which means that the statements of the 
respondents  are  not  really  related  to  the  precise  hypothetical  scenario  described,  but  to 
some wider inclusive conceptions of what is at danger or what their willingness-to-pay will 
allow to protect.  
In  the  last  decade,  growing  interest  has  gone  to  procedures  that  could  help  individuals 
construct reasoned preferences, namely through collective and deliberative process (Wilson 
et  Howarth,  2002;  Alvarez-Farizo  et  Hanley,  2006;  Spash,  2007).  As  long  as  the  stated 
preferences remain the most elaborated methods to address the social value of ecosystem, 
any methodological evolution that may lead to improve the informational basis that supports 
these approaches has to be studied seriously.  
The  elicitation  format  is  at  stake  also.  After  the  NOAA  Panel  identified  the  dichotomous 
choice as the only methodologically acceptable elicitation format for contingent valuation, this 
technique appears limiting since it implied larger sample sizes and appeared poorly able to 
handle  scenario  involving  multi-dimensional  changes.  For  both  these  reasons,  valuation 
analysts were increasingly interested in choice modelling techniques (Hanley et al., 2001). 
Moreover, choice modelling appeared to show a better sensitivity to scope since they give 
larger  values  than  contingent  valuation  for  the  overall  bundle  and  smaller  values  for 
individual components (Foster and Mourato, 2003). More generally, it is widely acknowledge 
that stated  preference methods  results  are  design-dependant,  especially  when  related  to 
non-use values.  
3.2  On which basis can biodiversity be valued?  
Biodiversity is not an object, but a characteristic of sets of objects, such as ecosystems at 
various scales. The question of what can be valued is then not trivial and the literature brings 
many different answers, from theoretical approaches to more observable objects. Since the 
Millennium  Ecosystem  Assessment,  valuing  biodiversity  from  ecosystem  services  has 
become a kind of standard approach, but several points remain questionable.  
3.2.1  Theoretical objects  
Since markets and even human preferences can be inadequate for decision-making, there is 
a  need  for  alternative  information.  Biodiversity  index,  build  by  scientists  to  compare 
situations,  appears  mostly  inappropriate  for  social  management.  Nevertheless,  many 
analyses,  considering  the  absence  of  relevant  information  on  individual  preferences  and 
collective interests, are trying to use them to build usable indexes.  
Weitzman (1992) proposed to value biodiversity from a measure of dissimilarity between 
taxonomic units that he calls “species” and which can stand for any reproductively isolated 
group.  The  index  is  build  from  dissimilarity  between  two  units  and  can  be  recursively 
extended to any set of “species”. In “The Noah Ark problem”, Weitzman (1998) build on this 
index a cost-effective approach which results can be useful ‘as a criterion to rank project. 
Metrick and Weitzman (1998) applied this ranking criterion to assess the cost-efficiency of 
the public expenditures related to the Endangered Species Act. They created proxies for the 
main variables and found that the most suitable dependent variable was the expenses for 
each action and the most significant explanatory variable was the size of the species.
5 As 
noted by Weikard (2002), the practical calculation of the index requir es impractical amounts 
of information, but the conceptual model could be applied to ecosystem functions.  Despite 
some provocative titles (Christie et al., 2006), empirical measures of the value of biodiversity 
and ecosystems are in fact on concrete objects and varied enough so that the choice is often 
motivated by the purpose of evaluation.  
                                                 
5  This  unexpected  result  was  in  fact  consistent  with  recent  knowledge  on  the  biological  traits  of 
species.    10 
3.2.2  Empirical objects  
Because  the  assessment  of  ecosystems  and  biodiversity  has  become  an  area  of 
collaboration  between  scientific  disciplines,  which  have  to  communicate  about  empirical 
objects, or simply because many studies were initiated by social demand or toward policy-
making,  a  large  body  of  the  scientific  literature  on  biodiversity  valuation  focuses  on 
biophysical objects. These objects can be very different and were generally chosen in order 
to represent one or another aspect of biodiversity. These objects can be briefly enumerated 
and a few representative studies mentioned: species (Richardson et Loomis, 2009); genes 
(Goeschl et Swanson, 2007; Sarr et al., 2008), ecosystems and habitats (Costanza et al., 
1997;  Amigues  et  al.,  2002),  ecological  functions  (Allen  et  Loomis,  2006;  Maltby,  2009); 
landscapes (Bonnieux et Legoffe, 1997; Swanwick et al., 2007).  
Whatever the object that existing analysis pretend valuing, it must be clear that valuations 
are related to changes in well-being associated with modifications in the characteristic of 
these objects and, more precisely, in their availability as a source of goods and services. 
This  is  certainly  why  since  early  publications,  such  as  Westman  (1977),  the  notion  of 
services was more and more used to introduce the beneficial uses of ecosystems in the 
utilitarian framework.  
3.2.3  Ecosystems services  
Ecosystem  services  are  usually  defined  as  the  benefits  people  obtain  from  ecosystems. 
These include provisioning services, such as food, clean water or raw material; regulating 
services, such as regulation of floods, drought, and in some cases disease; cultural services, 
such as recreational, spiritual, and other nonmaterial benefits; and supporting services, such 
as soil formation and nutrient cycling. This notion has become especially widespread with the 
Millennium  Ecosystem  Assessment  (MA,  2003;  2005),  which  stated  authoritatively  that 
ecosystems were experiencing serious degradation in regard to their capability of providing 
services, and, at the same time, the demand for ecosystem services was rapidly increasing 
as  populations  and  standards  of  living  increase.  The  Millennium  event  stated  that,  if 
ecosystem services were becoming increasingly scarce, it was “partially due to the lack of 
valuation because it is impossible to manage what we do not value” (MA, 2005), but it might 
be considered as somewhat self-serving.  
Although an important moment, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment did not initiated the 
current enthusiasm in ecosystem services. The idea has a long history that Mooney and 
Ehrlich (1997) initiate with the 1970 Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP, 1970), 
which first used the term ‘environmental services’. The list of identifiable services remained 
very variable with the authors’ choice. Westman (1977) was among the first to explicitly refer 
to the value of ‘nature’s services’, and finally Ehrlich and others used the term ‘ecosystem 
services’ in the early 1980s (Mooney and Ehrlich, 1997).  
Considering  the  relationship  of  ecosystem  to  societies  as  "services"  has  become  a 
meaningful qualification, clearly inspired from the services produced by humans. Comparing 
the issues related to maintaining ecosystems with other dynamics related to human activities 
might indeed be a dangerous concept, which, focusing on the sole final services that benefit 
humans, can obscure the complexity of ecosystems functioning (Ghazoul, 2007). Moreover, 
a major difference between social and ecosystem services lies in intentionality. Unlike human 
productions  and  business,  ecosystems  do  not  aim  at  fitting  human  needs.  This  is  the 
responsibility of human societies to adapt their organization to ecosystem functioning. And 
this ability determines to a large extend the social value of "ecosystem services".  
3.2.4  Quantification and valuation of ecosystem services  
There is a strong on-going debate on the possibility of quantifying and evaluating ecosystem 
services.  Ecosystem  services  are  the  conditions  and  processes  through  which  natural 
ecosystems and the species that make them up allow and sustain human life. There are thus   11 
many reasons to consider that ecosystems have both utilitarian and intrinsic values. The 
limited substitutability of Nature addresses difficult challenges for any valuation attempt and, 
in fact, for the quantification of these services.  
Following Gomez-Baggethum et al. (2010), it can be said that the monetary valuation was 
probably the main cornerstone that led in the 1980’s to cleave the economic approach of 
society-nature interaction between:  
-  environmental economics that favour an extension of monetary valuation techniques 
to non-market natural assets,  
-  ecological  economists  that  addressed  the  substitutability  of  natural  capital  and 
preference-based valuation as controversial issues.  
This  contrast  echoes  the  opposition  between  the  weak  and  strong  conceptions  of 
sustainability (Baumgartner, 2010). The former assumes a large substitutability that allows a 
monetary valuation of non-market natural assets, while the latter focuses on the importance 
of preserving a “critical natural capital” whose measurement remains nevertheless a problem 
(Ekins et al., 2003). This enduring opposition is known as the "incommensurability debate" 
and  often  considered  as  the  single  most  controversial  issue  in  CBA  (see  Aldred,  2006). 
Indeed, if no substitution is possible, the very principle of economic valuation fails and the 
meaning of any valuation no longer holds, except on the basis of the subjective judgments of 
the subjects involved.  
Recently, M. Sagoff (2011) relies on the analysis of F. Hayek on markets as information 
processes to ague that, in the absence of markets, the subjective nature of economic value 
renders the perception of ecosystem value by different economic agents incommensurable. 
The  economists  will  recognize  the  old  issue  of  the  impossibility  of  aggregating  agents’ 
preferences. Although, it appears somewhat specific here since there are limited possibilities 
to quantify physically ecosystem services and human preferences might be the only way to 
get a measurement. In other words, for such heterogeneous things as ecosystem services, 
quantification and valuation are not really distinct steps. And the alleged impossibility of the 
former implies the impossibility of the latter. This paper offers a meaningful enlightening on a 
recurring controversy, but, like many others, it does not allow to draw useful lessons for 
practical decision-making.  
3.3  Ecosystems and human well-being  
The  abundance  or  the  quality  of  natural  resources  does  not  constitute  a  guarantee  of 
improved  well-being.  The  economic  literature  shows  a  series  of  works  on  the  "resource 
curse",  that is  to say,  the paradox that natural resource-rich countries  tend to have less 
economic growth and worse development outcome than less well endowed countries. The 
contribution of ecosystems and biodiversity to human well-being is therefore contingent on 
the ability of societies to value these assets. The link between ecosystems and human well-
being therefore depends on the reality or, at least, the potential services that societies know 
how to get from them, but also on their capability to do without, and to rely on alternative 
resources (including human creativity).  
This complex relation can be represented in three steps:  
-  identification of ecosystem ecological functions  
-  description of the beneficial uses that societies get from these ecosystems  
-  analysis of the economic value of these services, according to available alternatives.  
Several recent publications follow the view developed by Haines-Young and Potschin (2010), 
which introduces a supplementary step. They split the concept of beneficial use in, firstly, a 
biophysical description of the service and, secondly, an analysis of how that service benefits 
to humans. This benefit is finally valued in economic terms.    12 
Figure 1. From ecosystem structure and function to ecosystem services, benefit and value  
 
Source : adapted from Haines-Young and Potschin (2010)  
 
The important point here is to understand and make readers, users or policy-makers that 
there is no direct link or proportionality between the bio-physical phenomenon and the social 
value.  Between  these  two  level  of  observation,  conceptualising  and  analysis,  several 
parameters strongly influence the final results, among which: available technologies, cultural 
preferences and, as it was emphasized above, freedom of choice, which determines in fact 
the final well-being that humans will be able, or not, to draw from the actual ecosystems.  
4  Results  
As it was emphasised above, applying the general CBA framework to biodiversity issues 
raises so many conceptual and technical difficulties that despite early calls (Krutilla, 1967; 
Helliwell, 1969; Westman, 1977; Randall, 1988) little practical works were achieved before 
the  last  two  decades.  On  the  contrary,  many  voices  spoke  against  the  possibility  or  the 
legitimacy of doing so (Ehrenfeld, 1988; Norton, 1988; Hanley et al., 1995). Nunes and van 
der Bergh (2001) tried to separate the meaningful achievable analysis from less credible 
attempts, and Hanley and Shogren (2002) still considered the idea of using CBA for nature 
conservation  arbitrage  as  “awkward  choice”  situations.  Despite  several  important 
clarifications, the reliability and the relevance of  the economic valuation ecosystems  and 
biodiversity remains strongly debated.  
It is not possible to provide here a review of the diversity of results obtained by the hundreds 
of studies that have evaluated one or another aspect of biodiversity. This section is thus 
organized  into  three  points:  the  economics  of  endangered  species,  the  valuation  of 
ecosystem services and, finally, a brief discussion of the distinction between general and 
remarkable  or  unique  biodiversity.  We  conclude  with  some  dangers  associated  with  the 
assimilation of the value of biodiversity with that of ecosystem services.    13 
4.1  The economics of endangered species   
There is a large body of studies on the value of species, whose existence is mainly due to 
the U.S. Endangered Species Act (1973), which led to this type of work being done from the 
point  of  view  of  budgetary  rationalisation  (see  Brown  and  Shogren,  1998;  Metrick  and 
Weitzman,  1998).  The  contingent  evaluation  method  is  well  suited  to  the  evaluation  of 
willingness-to-pay  (WTP)  for  the  conservation  of  endangered  species,  especially  for 
charismatic species. A lot can thus be found in the scientific journals, with a limitation that 
could be described as “publication bias”: each study must be presented in a limited format 
that leads authors and referees to put more interest on the methodological issues rather than 
the numerical results. Thus, the results are generally presented in the form of an econometric 
regression whose explained variable is a household's willingness-to-pay (usually yearly). The 
concerned population, which has to be estimated in order to calculate the social WTP, to be 
compared to the policy objective (to preserve the species in the world, the area, or a given 
specific surface), is in most case not even mentioned.  
Most  studies  concern  charismatic  or  emblematic  species.  It  should  be  stressed  that  this 
concept does not only depend on ecological aspects but also integrates the socio-cultural 
context  and may  thus  vary  according  to  the  places  and the generations.  The change of 
“status” of the lynx, the bear or the wolf, formerly driven out, and today “made into heritage”, 
is undoubtedly not entirely due to them becoming rare, which is already old news, and this 
phenomenon illustrates this well. By limiting our interest to modern times and to the Western 
cultural context, we gathered in table 2 a number of studies related to threatened vertebrate 
populations, for which the willingness-to-pay per household and per year was estimated for 
various protection measures. Most of this data resulted from a meta-analysis by Loomis and 
White  (1996)  relating  to  22  studies  carried  out  between  1983  and  1993  (here  only  the 
average values in current currency is given). 
Willingness-to-pay for diverse charismatic vertebrate species (in dollars per household and per year) 
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Loomis and White (1996) proposed a generalisation of this data, through a predictive multiple 
regression model with a basic amount of 11 dollars per year for the residents of the site, to 
which it is necessary to add 47 dollars if the species is a mammal, 33 dollars if it is a bird, 23 
dollars if the person is a visitor and not a resident (following a proximity paradox which states   14 
that residents value heritage assets less than visitors) and 42 dollars if a single payment is 
proposed (which in fact corresponds to a reduction in the total value). Brown and Shogren 
(1998)  showed  that  this  model  resulted  in  a  willingness  to  pay  which,  if  extended  to  all 
American households, would amount to devoting 1% GDP to protect 2% of the threatened 
species; they consider this result excessive.  
Richardson and Loomis (2009) updated the results obtained by Loomis and White (1996) by 
adding the work published after 1995 in new meta-analysis of the contingent evaluations 
related to the TEV of rare and endangered species. The two groups of studies are treated 
separately and the recent studies obtain in general higher willingnesses-to-pay, for which the 
significant explanatory variables are: change of size of the populations, the type of species, 
whether it belongs to the “charismatic megafauna”, the existence of non-use values; but, 
also, the year of the study, the type of subject questioned, the survey method, the rate of 
answers, and the frequency of the payments are also significant variables.  
These  methodological  refinements  do  not  eliminate  the  problems  involved  in  the  use  of 
stated preferences methods, in particular because of the importance of variables related to 
the  design  or  the  conditions  of  carrying  out  the  study,  beside  variables  related  to  the 
evaluated asset. In addition, the use of these values often brings a problem of disproportion, 
even  of  disconnection  between  the  location  and  the  sometimes  limited  character  of  the 
territory to be protected, because of the endangered character of these species, and the size 
and  location  of  the  population  considered  as  likely  to  pay,  because  of  the  charismatic 
character of these species and the importance of their option value or non-use value.  
Despite the large number of available studies, and the fact that many among them have 
been achieved in a cost-benefit analysis perspective (as required for the ESA), they do not 
bring  usable  information  for  decision  making  unless  there  are  explicitly  aimed  at  valuing 
action programs (see Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009). The same comment applies to the 
less numerous or empirically detailed studies related to genes or even habitats.  
4.2  The economics of ecosystem services  
The  concept  of  ecosystem  services  has  obtained  an  increasing  attention  as  a  mean  to 
communicate  about  the  societal  dependence  on  ecological  life  support  systems  (Daily, 
1997). A set of studies framed the beneficial use of ecosystems functions as services with 
the  aim  of  increasing  public  awareness  and  policy-makers  interests  in  biodiversity 
conservation (Gomez-Baggethum et al., 2010).  
The term “ecosystem services” refers to a set of benefits that fall into three distinct economic 
categories  (Barbier,  2007):  (i)  “goods”  (products  obtained  from  ecosystems  for  direct 
consumption or as inputs for industry, such as resource harvests, and genetic material); (ii) 
“services” (recreational and tourism benefits or certain ecological regulatory functions, such 
as water purification, climate or pollution regulation, erosion control); and (iii) cultural benefits 
(scientific  knowledge,  spiritual  and  religious  feelings,  heritage…).  Early  studies  had  to 
elaborate ad hoc lists of the services to be valued, according to what appeared to be mainly 
at  stake  in  the  study  areas,  mixing  sometimes  ambiguously  services  for  human  and 
ecological functions  
Costanza et al (1997) have established a general framework in their attempt to evaluate the 
world's ecosystems. They identified and proposed estimates for 17 categories of services, for 
all terrestrial and marine environments. The value of just the coastal environments, including 
estuaries, coastal wetlands, plant communities and algae fields, coral reefs and continental 
shelves, represent 43% of the total, even though they only cover 6.3% of the surface of the 
globe.  This  weight  seems  to  be  related  to  the  role  that  these  environments  play  in  the 
regulation  of  nutrient  cycles,  both  terrestrial  and  marine,  whose  monetarisation  seems 
however to be particularly tricky.    15 
The final results were provocative enough to offer them the recognition they received: the 
value of services rendered annually was estimated between one and three times the value of 
the world gross product, due for a large part to coastal and littoral ecosystems. Among the 
many critics this work received, one was related to the meaning of valuing assets monetarily 
at a higher level than the global wealth, which assumed implicitly a conception of the wealth 
that go far beyond income.  
Extending  the  study  of  Costanza  et  al.  to  23  “functions”  (regulation,  habitat,  goods  and 
services,  information)  De  Groot  et  al.  (2002)  gives  the  value  ranges  for  all  the  world 
ecosystems. Without considering here all these figures, it must be mentioned that they can 
take values ranging from a few dollars to tens, hundreds and often several thousands of 
dollars per hectare and per year. The importance of the variations can be explained mainly 
by variations in the quality of the ecosystems and variations in the intensity of the uses, but 
also by the evaluation method because the different techniques do not capture the same 
attributes.  
The  Millennium  Ecosystem  Assessment  (MA)  established  of  a  conceptual  framework  for 
documenting, analysing, and understanding social–ecological systems, which has had wide 
influence in the policy and scientific communities (MA, 2005). The process resulted in a list of 
22 ecosystem services, organized in four major categories: the provisioning services, the 
regulating services, the cultural services and the so-called support services, which are in fact 
interactions within and between ecosystems, that do not directly contribute to human well-
being, but maintain the possibility of the other services categories.  
Despite  the  fact  that  the  MEA  remains  the  reference  framework,  the  definition  and  the 
classification of the ecosystem services remains an open and discussed question (Boyd and 
Banzhaf, 2007; Wallace, 2007; Costanza, 2008; Fisher et al., 2009). Among the difficulties, 
the  following  must  be  mentioned:  the  mixed  public  goods  character  (public-private);  the 
difficulties  in  understanding  the  spatial  and  temporal  dynamics,  the  “joint  production” 
character  of  several  services  by  the  same  ecosystem;  the  complexity  of  the  interactions 
between  the  structures,  functions  and  services;  the  fact  that  the  agents  only  identify  as 
services those from which they benefit (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007).  
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study
6 aimed, for its scientific part 
(TEEB-D0),  to  build  a  synthesis  of  “the  latest  ecological  and  economic  knowledge  to 
structure the evaluation of ecosystem services under different scenarios, and to recommend 
appropriate valuation methodologies for different contexts. It also aims to examine the global 
economic costs of biodiversity loss and the costs and benefits of actions to reduce these 
losses” (TEEB website). 
TEEB proposes a typology of 22 ecosystem services, defined as “the direct and indirect 
contributions  of  ecosystems  to  human  well-being”.  Relatively  to  the  MA  definition,  it 
introduces a distinction between services and benefits in order to explicit that services can 
benefit people in multiple and indirect ways, and it omits supporting services such as nutrient 
cycling  and  food-chain  dynamics,  which  are  seen  as  ecological  processes.  A  “habitat” 
service has been identified as a separate category to highlight the importance of ecosystems 
to  provide  habitat  for  migratory  species  (nursery  service)  and  gene-pool  (namely  for 
commercial species).  
It would be quite presumptuous to pretend give a critical point of view on the many outputs of 
this encompassing study. But we can come back in a few words on the key messages of the 
large synthesis related to the Ecologic and Economics Foundations (de Groot et al., 2010). 
TEEB puts clear emphasis on: the importance of linking biophysical aspects of ecosystems 
with human benefits through the notion of ecosystem services for assessing the trade-offs 
(ecological, socio-cultural, economic and monetary) involved in the loss of ecosystems and 
                                                 
6  The  TEEB  study  (2007-2011)  is  hosted  by  UNEP  with  financial  support  from  the  European 
Commission, Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Japan.    16 
biodiversity ; the need to make ecosystem assessment spatially and temporally explicit at 
scales meaningful for policy-making since both ecological functioning and economic values 
are context, space and time dependant; the necessity of evaluating within the context of 
contrasting scenarios since both the values of ecosystem services and the costs of actions 
are best measured as a function of changes between alternative options; be attentive to 
include  in  the  assessment  the  total  bundle  of  ecosystem  services  provided  by  different 
conversion and management options; staying aware of the cost side of the equation, as 
focus on benefits only ignores important societal costs like missed opportunities; integrate an 
analysis  of  risks  and  uncertainties,  acknowledging  the  limitations  of  knowledge  on  the 
impacts  of  human  actions  on  ecosystems  and  their  services  and  on  their  importance  to 
human well-being.  
Apart from the very last words that sacrifice for the ideology of transparency, assuming it is 
both  feasible  and  appropriate,  these  recommendations  appear  of  real  interest  when 
compared to the content of numerous existing studies. In a pure economist perspective, the 
determination of the biophysical basis of the services is not generally required. But it is here 
of importance, once acknowledged that some of the services might be poorly perceived or 
understood by individuals. The integration of the biophysical basis plays as a safety belt that 
maintains the analyst on her way in order not to shorten her checklist.  
4.3  General and unique biodiversities  
In conservation policies, the distinction between general and unique biodiversity is widely 
used  to  justify  specific  protection  measures  for  unique  or  extraordinary  elements  of 
ecosystems. This distinction is not independent of human judgement: what is exceptional 
nature? Beautiful landscape, endangered species, remnants of disappearing ecosystems?  
In a large meta-analysis of the valuations of wetlands (Brander et al., 2006) an uncommon 
result can be observed: the mean value of the “biodiversity” characteristic (whatever it may 
mean) was more than thousand times its median value (17000$ to some 15$/ha.year). The 
simplest explanation is that among the panel of studies used for the meta-analysis, some 
were related to exceptional ecosystems with unique biological diversity and were then highly 
valued  by  the  individuals,  when  other  sites  were  of  non-remarkable  diversity  and  poorly 
valued for that purpose. Assuming a majority of sites with limited value for diversity, and a 
significant minority with very high diversity value, the statistical results is no longer amazing. 
And it may be the better way to oppose scientifically general and unique biodiversities.  
Valuing  unique  assets  is  always  a  difficult  task,  and  it  gets  worse  when  the  asset  is 
considered a heritage. The analyst is then faced with a series of additional challenges: how 
to reason substitutability, how to handle the social-ecological dynamics of the asset, which 
confidence give to the non-use values?  
The economic concept of substitutability goes far beyond the technical notion of replacing an 
object by an equivalent object, if not in the form, at least in its function. This approach would 
not in fact be satisfactory for unique assets (which object could possibly replace the Mona 
Lisa  if  it  happened  to  be  destroyed  ?  A  copy  ?).  The  economic  substitution  must  be 
understood as a possibility of compensation in terms of final services, or even of well-being. 
The destruction of the Mona Lisa would be a great misfortune, but it seems unlikely that it 
would cause the end of the world, not even of the world as we know it. For each of us, even 
this great loss would probably be compensated in one way or another. It would be quite 
different if we were talking of the destruction of all existing artwork. In that case, the world as 
we know it would be radically and permanently changed, and there is probably no way to 
evaluate this change.  
Ecosystem dynamics is a central issue for an adequate analysis of the social stakes related 
to  biodiversity  conservation.  In  economic  valuations,  time  is  usually  taken  into  account 
through “discounting”, which allows effects occurring at different times in the future to be 
compared by converting each future euro into a common currency of equivalent present euro   17 
by  multiplying  it  by  a  discount  factor
7. The choice of the discount rate is of particular 
importance for projects involving long time horizon because in such situations even tiny 
changes in the discount rate can dr astically modify the results of the valuation. These 
questions have become an especially acute issue in the economics of climate change, but 
ecosystems and biodiversity might address at least as complicated questions. In a few words 
(see Chevassus-au-Louis et al. (2009) for an extensive presentation):  
-  there are strong arguments in favour of a lower discounting rate for natural assets 
than  for  manufactured  goods  of  at  least  1%,  due  to  different  evolution  of  their 
anticipated future prices,  
-  the uniqueness of these assets creates option values that must be added to their 
preservation value,  
-  if these assets are seen as irreplaceable (it's a matter of judgement) then they should 
be evaluated as exhaustible resources (“Hotelling rule”).  
Evaluating unique assets gives logically a larger weight to non-use values than for more 
common  ecosystems  or  habitats.  Unfortunately,  despite  their  indisputable  importance  to 
integrate consideration less directly related to usefulness in the evaluation, non-use values 
raise many problems, both conceptual (are they economic values?) and methodological (how 
to get reliable information on their “importance”, how to define the population concerned; 
etc.). It can then not be expected that evaluations of unique biodiversity assets will produce 
robust results. Stated preferences method allow to get results, but most analysts agree that 
these results must be replaced in a deliberative framework that allows all the issues and 
stakeholders to express their views.  
In the report of the French Centre d’Analyse Strat￩gique that aimed at producing "reference 
values"  for  public  socio-economic  assessment  of  the  impact  of  human  settlements  on 
ecosystems (Chevassus-au-Louis, 2009), the latter considerations led to skip the case of 
"remarkable" biodiversity, considering furthermore that "reference values" for unique assets 
would be a contradiction in the terms. 
4.4  Valuing ecosystem services or biological diversity  
Recently, Norgaard (2010) expressed his concern that assimilating nature’s diversity to a 
provider of services, although an “eye-opening metaphor”, may become a “blinder” of the 
complexity of the ecological processes that render these services available to human beings. 
This concern encompasses several of the above debate : intrinsic vs. utilitarian values, bias 
related to incomplete information and understanding of ecosystem functioning, etc. But this 
concern can also be interpreted as reflecting the existence of very real differences between 
the categories underlying concepts biodiversity and ecosystem services. This separation is 
evident in the meta-analysis on the value of wetlands mentioned above (Brander et al., 2006) 
in  which  the  "biodiversity"  appears  as  a  particular  argument  among  other  ecosystem 
services.  In  the  same  way,  when  Christie  et  al.  (2006)  pretend  “valuing  the  diversity  of 
biodiversity”, it makes clear that, in this particular case, the distinction was problematic.  
Although it is repeatedly stated that diversity is a characteristic of ecosystems that increases 
their ability to provide services, this assertion is true only in general, and in each case, the 
precise relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem services must be analyzed. We can 
not ignore situations in which an increase in diversity can result in degradation of servces. It 
is the case of certain human diseases whose prevalence is reinforced by the proximity of 
ecosystems such as forests or wetlands. And productive activities that operate artificialized 
environments such as agriculture (Zhang et al., 2007), forestry or aquaculture, although their 
excesses have led to massive losses of diversity, must continually find equilibria that involve 
                                                 
7 For readers not familiar with economics, the discount factor is generally build like a simple composite 
interest calculus, based on an annual discount rate.    18 
a  minimum  level  of  control  against  over-diversification  of  farmed  environments  (weeds, 
pests, etc.). More generally, it must be accepted that the dependence of ecosystem services 
upon biodiversity varies widely with the nature of the service.  
That is the conclusion that Braat and Ten Brink (2008) illustrated in Figure 2 which shows 
that  if  the  regulating  services  are  fairly  systematically  promoted  by  diversity,  provision 
services instead pass through a maximum when diversity is managed appropriately. The 
case of cultural services has led the authors to distinguish between scientific and spiritual 
services that are maximal in wild nature, and recreation or tourism which benefit from certain 
facilities  
 
Figure 2. A general perspective on ecosystem services and human transformation of nature  
 
Source : Braat et Ten Brink, 2008  
 
5  Discussion  
“The total value of biodiversity is infinite so having a debate about what is the total value of 
nature is actually pointless because we can’t exist without it." (Robert Scholes, ecologist)  
The legitimacy of evaluating biodiversity remains at stake. It can be suspected that behind 
these criticisms, there is some misunderstanding of what economic evaluation really means. 
The issue is not to put an economic value on nature, which would indeed be pointless, but to 
translate the value of losses from the destruction of some ecosystems in terms that allow 
comparison  with  other  societal  issues.  Scholes  assertion  is  actually  based  on  confusion 
between two different aggregation issues: the economic value of the whole biosphere, which 
is obviously a non-sense, and the sum of all the economic reason to conserve or preserve 
ecosystems. And even this more limiter assessment can not be done in absolute terms, bat   19 
has to be related to a precise context of what threatens this ecosystem and how : “a default 
value of zero for a difficult-to-measure ecological value, as is used (explicitly or implicitly) in a 
number of cost–benefit analyses, is no more defensible scientifically than a default value of 
infinity.  But  this  only  underscores the  need  for  evaluating  ecological  services  in  context” 
(Toman, 1998). To go further in this direction, we will briefly review what should not be done 
and  what  should  be  tried,  before  turning  to  the  contexts  in  which  the  evaluation  of 
ecosystems can have a real meaning. 
5.1  Values of the services vs. preservation cost: looking for efficiency  
Confronted to the many uncertainties and controversies that follow the economic valuation of 
ecosystem, an alternative is often proposed: instead of evaluating the cost of the destruction 
or degradation of the threatened ecosystems, which is of course the same thing as the value 
of the ecosystem services, why not to estimate the preservation or restoration costs?  
This solution, which seems very comforting, is actually a false good idea. Apparently, the 
evaluator  may  believe  that  he  is  shifting from  an  assessment  based  on  preferences  too 
difficult  to  assess,  in  a  more  reliable  estimate based  on  the  cost  of  technical  supply.  In 
practice, it provides a measure of cost that it might be totally irrational to bear, because it can 
be much higher than the value of lost services. Following this fallacy, the analyst has lost the 
very principle of economic valuation: the search for efficiency.  
There  are  nevertheless  cases  when  this  approach  can  be  adequate.  If  the  definition  of 
objective appears out of reach of any economic analysis (and this is definitely the case in 
many situations), the search for efficiency should lead to achieve the goal determined on 
other bases at lower cost, and analysing the costs of preservation, conservation, restoration 
or replacement, whichever is deemed possible, then is the basis of this analysis.  
Ideally, economists may wish to put their analysis in a cost-benefit framework, which is the 
only one to provide a measure of efficiency, but this would require being able to estimate the 
all the costs, market and non-market, associated with every possible situation to determine 
what would be the best situation. At the optimum, the marginal value of services and the 
marginal costs of conservation would be equal. But making all these calculations is generally 
not realistic. 
5.2  Evaluating potential  
Most existing evaluation relate to services actually rendered by ecosystems here and now. If 
the  objective  is  to  assess  whether  the  expected  profits  from  the  destruction  of  these 
environments will be greater than that of the lost ecosystem services, one must be careful to 
compare two trajectories of the same nature, and not the reality of ecosystems that may 
have suffered other damage, with the uncertain promises of idealized projects. Since there 
are few ways to make developers to abandon their optimism about their projects, there is no 
reason to value biodiversity according to the present state of ecosystem services, but rather 
such they should be at the relevant time horizon, if the rules favourable to their maintenance 
are applied.  
Since  good  practices  in  evaluation  are  to  measure  the  differences  between  contrasting 
scenarios,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  that  the  values  of  ecosystem  services  taken  into 
account were that which would be effective in a favourable scenario. The word "favourable" 
should not be construed as referring to a pristine wilderness that will not exist anymore, but 
as the result of changes in real ecosystems at a specific horizon, assuming that reasonable 
choices for maintaining them were made.    20 
5.3  Valuing ecosystems for better decision-making  
On the one hand some economists and ecologists are convinced that economic analysis is 
an adequate framework for improving decisions involving conservation aspects (Heal et al., 
2005). On the other hand, other ecologists or policy analysts consider this task as unrealistic 
and misleading (see Chee, 2004; Sagoff, 2008). In a recent article, Wainger et al. (2010) 
were therefore legitimate to address the somewhat iconoclastic question: “Can the concept 
of  ecosystem  service  be  practically  applied  to  improve  natural  resource  management 
decision?”.  
5.3.1  Decision without explicit valuation  
It  may  appear  somewhat  surprising  to  read  so  many  warnings  about  the  unreliability  of 
economic evaluations, particularly when they relate to ecosystem services, whereas, in real 
decision-making, namely in France, economic evaluation appears to have so little influence 
on  the  final  choices.  The  question  therefore  remains  somewhat  theoretical,  or  refers  to 
foreign contexts. It is of course complicated by the fact that agents-citizens-voters have, in 
this case, a biased perception of the real issues.  
The position of a policymaker that is to make a choice in an area where people have wrong 
beliefs has in fact been studied by economists (Salanié et Treich, 2009). This case can be 
considered as a simple extrapolation of a situation in which there is no reliable or recognized 
assessment. Without  going  into  this  interesting  model,  we  will  recall  the  three  situations 
identified and characterized by the authors:  
-  dictatorship,  when  the  decision  is  made  according  to  the  sole  preferences  of  the 
Prince, or of the interests he may serve,  
-  populism, when the decision is made according to the preferences of people, or of the 
best  organized  lobby,  even  though  the  policy-maker  knows  that  their  beliefs  are 
wrong,  
-  paternalism : when decision relies on expert knowledge to serve the real interests of 
people, even if they do not realize the dangers they are protected in this way.  
There is no need  to enter  in technical aspects to make understandable that these three 
situations do not compare favourably with the case when an explicit valuation allows the 
policy-maker to make choices according to the real interests of the population. It is admitted 
here  that  these  interests  are  not  easily  identifiable,  and  much  less  quantifiable  or 
economically assessable. But do not even try is probably worse.  
5.3.2  Valuation as a guide for decision making 
Since  ecosystem  services  are  not  fully  captured  in  commercial  markets  or  adequately 
quantified in terms comparable with economic services and manufactured products, they are 
often given too little weight in policy decisions. There is then a need, like for many assets 
involving public good aspects, to implement public policies for efficiency considerations. In 
this  perspective,  the  evaluation  of  ecosystems  as  a  means  of  improving  information  for 
decision-making  is  a  recurring  proposal  of  the  groups  established  to  consider  this  issue 
(Bingham et al., 1995, Heal et al, 2005 ; Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009 TEEB, 2009; Daily 
et al., 2010). A body of academic works have explored some of the technical or informational 
difficulties that such approaches are meeting and identified more or less realistic ways to 
treat them  .  
When reviewing a set of these works, it is readily apparent that most are pursuing the same 
goal: defining cost-efficient, least-cost, or efficient conservation policies (Ando et al, 1998; 
Murdoch  et  al.,  2007;  Polasky  et  al.,  1999;  Polasky  et  al.,  2001;  Turpie  et  al.,  2003; 
Underwood et al., 2008; Wätzold et Schwerdtner, 2005; Wu et Bogess, 1999). Apparently, no   21 
published study aim to characterize an optimal policy of conservation, with the purpose of 
justifying the objectives of conservation relatively to other legitimate social goals.  
This  latter  objective,  which  would  be  the  most  consistent  with  the  purpose  of  economic 
analysis, is probably unrealistic given the quality of results. And we must recognize that most 
studies that attempt to situate their subject in a clear theoretical framework, do not go further 
than declarations of intent. And one must acknowledge with the authors that the quality and 
incompleteness  of  information,  notwithstanding  possible  conceptual  difficulties,  can  not  a 
priori to do better than the construction of indicators of values that can be incorporated into 
the economic assessment of the projects that affect biodiversity.  
Several  authors  have  nevertheless  stated  that  it  would  be  possible  to  go  further,  and 
considered that valuation might be a first step toward a “commodification” of Nature.  
5.4  Valuation as a prerequisite for institution building?  
A  body  of  literatures  tends  to  consider  economic  valuation  as  a  simple  step  toward 
institutional  innovation,  namely  the  creation  of  Payment  for  Ecosystem  Service  (PES) 
schemes (see Gomez-Baggethum et al, 2010) and possibly of new property rights.  
5.4.1  Designing policy instruments  
The  payment  schemes  for  ecosystem  services  have  mostly  appeared  in  Latin  America, 
namely Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008), as a practical way to raise money for conservation. They 
have further sometimes be seen a universal policy instrument, up to the point that Engel et al 
(2005) felt the need to clarify that: “PES is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any 
environmental problem, but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in 
which ecosystems are mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the 
perspective of ecosystem managers.” (Engel et al, 2005). The PES are however a rather 
broad category, in which can probably be classified some of the mechanisms of the Second 
Pillar of the CAP.  
It must be clear that there is no direct link between the value of ecosystems and the prices 
the PES mechanisms can create as an incentive for ecosystem services preservation or 
enhancement. Like in the case of cost-efficient policies, the price in a PES mechanism is 
supposed to reflect the opportunity costs of the farmers or any other social category that 
become beneficiary of such a mechanism in exchange of fulfilling some ecological target or 
implementing some constraint in terms of ecosystem use.  
Muradian et al. (2010) devote special emphasis to institutional and political economy issues, 
related  to  the  PES.  They  consider  there  is  a  gap  between  the  Coasean  approach  that 
dominates  the  design  of  PES  in  the  economic  literature  and  what  can  be  practically 
implemented. According to their analysis, PES must, on the contrary, be analysed taking into 
account complexities related to uncertainty, distributional issues, social embeddedness, and 
power relations in order to understand the variety of contexts and institutional settings in 
which PES operate. Even if the reality of PES is usually very far from an efficient market, 
implementing PES schemes means to some extend designing new property rights   
5.4.2  Designing new property rights?  
Can it be both possible and appropriate to go beyond the implementation of incentives policy 
instruments and to use economic valuation for defining of new property rights? This would be 
the standard Coasean answer to the externalities issues. And, while being more cautious 
with the realities, this way was proposed by some positive studies, such as Chichilnisky and 
Heal (1998), Heal (2000; 2003) or McCauley (2006), which explore the potential to manage 
biodiversity by bundling it with marketable assets like agricultural products, pharmaceutical 
bio-prospecting contracts or eco-tourism.    22 
Is this way really so promising? It is of course difficult to state definitely on potentials, and the 
economic theory of property rights has stressed since early papers (Demsetz, 1967) that new 
property  rights  potentially  emerges  when  there  is  more  benefits  in  appropriation  then 
transaction  costs  for  their  implementation.  New  property  rights  may  even  create  new 
responsibilities and appropriate incentives but, some basic principle shape their potential. 
Demsetz  clearly  distinguishes  between  the  goods  and  the  related  rights  that  “When  a 
transaction is concluded in the marketplace, two bundles of property rights are exchanged. A 
bundle of rights often attaches to a physical commodity or service, but it is the value of the 
rights that determines the value of what is exchanged” (Demsetz, 1967). This statement 
remains useful today to understand that the values revealed by any market are no more (and 
no  less)  than  the  value  of  what  the  prevailing  property  right  regime  defines  as  being 
marketable. Faced with the complexity of ecosystems and biodiversity, it appears  
Faced  with  the  complexity  and  uncertainty  attached  to  biodiversity  and  ecosystem 
functioning, it seems unlikely that a comprehensive system of rights should never be able to 
cover all issues. The conclusion is ineluctably that even if efficiency gains can be expected 
from the definition of new rights allowing to expand the social management of the benefits 
that humans obtain from ecosystems, some aspect of these benefits will not be supported 
appropriately by these  mechanisms and public policies, relying on a broader and shared 
understanding of issues, will remain necessary.  
5.5  Final words  
In a literature and issues review, Turner et al. (2003) stated that “In the last 30 years or so, 
valuation of environmental change and services has become one of the most significant and 
fastest evolving areas of research in environmental and ecological economics.” Many non-
specialists might have believed that this field was mostly developed after 2003. Turner et al. 
relate  this  massive  interest  to  the  motivation  to  build  a  better  and  more  comprehensive 
informational base for the policy formulation and decision making process.  
When related to ecosystems and biodiversity, so as when related to about anything else, 
valuation is not a solution or an end in itself, but firstly a conceptual and methodological 
framework for organizing information as a guide for decision-making. Daily et al. (2000) went 
further: “It is one tool in the much larger politic of decision-making. Wielded together with 
financial  instruments  and  institutional  arrangements  that  allow  individuals  to  capture  the 
value  of  ecosystem  assets,  however,  the  process  of  valuation  can  lead  to  profoundly 
favourable effects.”  
This last point remains today questionable. In the current state of the art, is the valuation of 
ecosystem services able to support a relevant “internalisation” of the non-market benefits of 
conservation?  The  answer  is  unfortunately  negative.  And  the  explanation  does  not 
necessarily lie in some failure of the conceptual framework, but rather in the weakness of our 
practical information and, possibly, of the valuation techniques, which have to struggle with 
poorly  motivated  preferences  to  achieve  price-equivalent  consistent  with  the  common 
monetary  metric  usable  with  competing  uses.  Alternative  approaches  to  build  a  value 
concept on objective information have not really succeeded to produce a usable framework 
that links conceptually empirical observations with normative social objectives
8.  
The political will to continue developing a conceptual and methodological framework that has 
not established its capacity to handle the complexity of the natures -societies interaction can 
certainly be related to the growing evidence that we are living in a world of increasing 
scarcity (Baumgärtner et al., 2006). In this coming world – this world may already be the one 
we are living in – the situations when choice between competing uses of ecosystems might 
                                                 
8 None of  the most promising proposals, such as energy, “emergy” or ecological footprint, can be 
clearly related  with normative concept compatible with collective decision-making in other fields of 
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become more and more numerous. And explicit analysis methods may become a necessity 
to legitimate brutal choices.  
Finally, the choice is not between valuing or not valuing, it is between valuing with explicit 
and contestable methods and valuing implicitly and referring to general principles that have 
in  many  cases  been  analysed  as  manipulated,  like  in  some  well  studied  situations  (see 
Johansson-Stenman & Konow, 2010), in which the equity argument is used in a self-serving 
objective (known as “equity bias”).  
Even if the non-use values remain difficult to assess in a strict economic framework, the 
combination  of  evaluation  methods  with  more  deliberative  approaches,  favourishing  the 
formation  of  consistent  and  reasoned  preferences,  could  allow  some  reconciliation  of 
instrumental and intrinsic values (Norton & Noonan. 2007). At stake here is nothing less than 
the  design  and  implementation  of  biodiversity  policies  that  articulate  the  goals  of 
conservation with those of preservation.  
To emphasize that economic evaluation should remain a means and never an end, we let the 
last word to D. Ehrenfeld (1988), who in the seminal book of Wilson, after a plea against the 
idea of putting a value on biodiversity, concluded: “I cannot help thinking that when we finish 
assigning values to biological diversity, we will find that we don’t have very much biological 
diversity left”. Ecosystem services valuation would remain meaningless if it does not help to 
make better practical choices and actions.   
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